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Toward the end of his 1993 text Sauf le nom, Derrida employs the
word ‘revolution’ on two occasions. This might strike us as strange
in a text that is ostensibly a reading of the seventeenth-century poet
and mystic Angelus Silesius, and which, more broadly, deals with the
relationship between deconstruction and negative theology. The word
comes up in the midst of a discussion of Silesius’s treatment of God
in his Cherubinic Wanderer: the nature of God, what is proper to him,
what he keeps secret and what he gives forth; more specifically, how he
gives forth that which he does not possess and hence cannot give.
The passage in question bears on the theme of contamination.
After wondering whether Silesius is the best example to employ in a
discussion of negative theology, Derrida notes that, in a way, there is
no text that fits fully within this tradition, for the simple reason that it
is everywhere. ‘I don’t believe,’ writes Derrida, ‘that any text is not in
some way contaminated by negative theology, even among those texts
that apparently do not have, want, or believe they have any relation
with theology in general.’1 What is it that gives negative theology
this power of contamination, this ability to turn up — to speak — in
places where it is least expected? This question runs counter to the
ways we usually think of negative theology, whose modus operandi
seems to set up to avoid a particular contamination, that of language:
when I seek to approach God, reasons the negative theologian, I run
the risk of perverting or contaminating his nature in my words, since
by attributing qualities or characteristics to him, I do an injustice to
his essential unknowability; and hence the best way to do justice to
God is to say what he is not, and to register, via this negation, his
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very inaccessibility. I must literally speak what he is not — speak his
nothingness, in a sense — and for this reason, negative theology, as
Derrida notes on two occasions, has often been accused of being an
atheism.2
In any case, this is how negative theology seeks, as Derrida puts it,
‘to say and join what is proper to God’ (69/82, translation modified,
Derrida’s emphasis). But what is the proper if ‘the proper of this
proper consists in expropriating itself, if the proper of the proper
is precisely, justly, to have nothing of its own?’ (69/82, Derrida’s
emphasis). Derrida is strikingly close to Silesius here, whom he cites:
What is God’s own proper? to pour forth in creation
To be the same in all times, to have, want, know nothing. (Quoted
in Derrida, 70/83)
A seeming contradiction: God pours forth, yet has nothing. And
Derrida immediately refers to this giving without having (which he
compares to the working of the Good in Plotinus, and in which
the resonances of the concept of kenosis are clear) with the term
revolution.
Now this revolution, at once interior and exterior, which makes
philosophy, onto-theological metaphysics, pass over the other edge
of itself, is also the condition of its translatability. What makes
philosophy go outside itself calls for a community that overflows its
tongue and undertakes a process of universalization.
– What makes it go outside itself would come to it thus already from
the outside, from the absolute outside. That is why the revolution
could not be only internal.
– That’s exactly what it says, what the mystics and the theologians
of apophasis say when they speak of an absolute transcendence
that announces itself from within. All that comes down to the
same or, indifferently, to the other. (70/84, translation modified)
What exactly does this twice-named (or thrice-named, if we include the
‘it’ of the first sentence of the final ‘utterance’) revolution indicate —
or rather, why does Derrida name this giving of that which one does
not have, this going outside oneself or itself, a revolution? We get an
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indication from both the second and third utterances above, where
Derrida seems to indicate a back and forth movement from inside to
outside and vice versa — wouldn’t revolution, according to the logic
of the term, name a movement by which an entity goes away, only to
come back. . . to itself? Yet this is not exactly what Derrida indicates:
he mentions Silesius’s pouring forth of the non-proper, this impossible
gift, yet he never gestures toward any counter-movement, even if that
which pours forth somehow comes from without. What is clear, in
other words, is that this pouring-forth is not balanced by a replenishing:
somehow, nothing gives forth, and continues to do so. How are we to
understand this, and why exactly is it a revolution?
Whatever the answer may be, let us make two observations at
this point. First, Derrida clearly indicates a relationship between this
revolution and speaking. Sauf le nom, after all, is a book that is obsessed
by speech, from the fact that it is set up as a conversation between
two interlocutors,3 to its constant references to speaking in all of its
variations. We need merely glance at the end of the passage cited above
to see this at work: revolution, Derrida writes, says a transcendence that
announces itself from within. What we are dealing with, in other words,
is a kind of revolutionary voice, one that speaks at the intersections of
negative theology and deconstruction.
And this is the second observation: that Derrida, throughout this
text, is concerned with the links, intersections, blurring of boundaries,
between negative theology and deconstruction. To say this is to veer
into controversial territory, given that, since his first writings, Derrida
has been ‘accused’4 of being a negative theologian, or at least of
employing the methods of this tradition. The debate around these
issues still rages, and the most prominent recent writer to take part
in it is Martin Hägglund. In his 2008 book Radical Atheism: Derrida
and the Time of Life, Hägglund argues that it is misguided to speak
of any link between Derrida and negative theology, since the latter
‘adheres to the most traditional metaphysical logic by positing an
instance that is exempt from temporal finitude’.5 It is important to note
that Hägglund, in making this claim, draws on the words of Derrida
himself, who in 1968 wrote of différance that it is
not theological, not even in the order of the most negative of all
negative theologies, which are always concerned with disengaging a
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superessentiality beyond the finite categories of essence and existence,
that is, of presence, and always hastening to recall that God is refused
the predicate of existence, only in order to acknowledge his superior,
inconceivable, and ineffable mode of being. Such a development is
not in question here.6
Hägglund quotes most of this passage early in his book, and with
reason: the testimony of Derrida on this matter, in what is perhaps
his most famous essay, is obviously very important. But even more
interesting from our standpoint are the words Hägglund writes
immediately after this quotation: ‘Derrida repeats the same argument
in his two main texts on negative theology: “How to Avoid Speaking”
and Sauf le nom’ (4).
This is an extremely strange claim. Why would Derrida write
two entire texts — a book and a long essay — in order to repeat an
argument made years before?7 A cursory glance at either of these
texts shows that this is simply not the case: early in Sauf le nom, for
example, we read that Silesius’s thought ‘seems strangely familiar to
the experience of what is called “deconstruction”’ (43/31, translation
modified); a bit further on: ‘All the apophatic mystics can also be
read as powerful discourses on death, on the (impossible) possibility
of the proper death of the being-there that speaks’ (44/34); later
in this passage, Derrida writes that the ‘coherence’ between negative
theology and the thought of Heidegger ‘seems to me profound and
the continuity rigorous’ (45/34–5); and a few pages on, Derrida speaks
of a series of traditional oppositions (form and content, concept and
metaphor, etc.) that one ‘can or must deconstruct,’ but which negative
theology has already ‘powerfully contributed to calling into question’
(49/45). Far from simply dismissing negative theology, as Hägglund
would have us think, Derrida views the relationship between it and
deconstruction as extremely complex: the two have much in common,
and something interesting and indeed vital for Sauf le nom takes place
at their intersection, or in what we might think of as their mutual
contamination.
The reasons for which Hägglund prevents himself from engaging
with this relationship lie in his theoretical framework, which is heavily
dependent on a certain concept: that of desire. This concept is at the
Cory Stockwell 119
heart of what he calls radical atheism, as he explains at the beginning
of the book:
Atheism has traditionally limited itself to denying the existence
of God and immortality, without questioning the desire for God
and immortality. Thus, in traditional atheism mortal being is still
conceived as a lack of being that we desire to transcend. In contrast,
by developing the logic of radical atheism, I argue that the so-called
desire for immortality dissimulates a desire for survival that precedes
it and contradicts it from within. (1)
Traditional atheism, Hägglund argues, has not gone far enough: it has
denied the existence of God, but this denial has usually taken the form
of a lament. The task of radical atheism, on the contrary, is to affirm
mortal being, indeed to desire what Hägglund calls the ‘time of life,’ in
which every moment is a matter of survival. Indeed, this is not a matter
of choice, since the religious notion of immortality contradicts itself:
the existence of an immortal realm, unscathed or uncontaminated by
time, would make life impossible, since life is predicated on the idea
that it may come to an end at any moment, and if this were not the
case, one would never have the desire to do anything.8 The very fact
of living is thus an affirmation of finitude, and renders impossible the
notion of an immortality unscathed or uncontaminated by time.
Hägglund’s claims are clearly compelling, as is evidenced by the
far-reaching debates that his book has provoked. Indeed, to my
mind, his work is not only interesting but urgent, not only from a
theoretical but also from a political standpoint, given the extent to
which ‘religious’ claims — or, to be more specific, claims based on
the assumption of ‘indemnity’, a realm uncontaminated by time —
have come to be viewed as acceptable in contemporary political
discourse. Yet there is something about this book — which claims
to work within deconstruction, and which takes up and expands
many of Derrida’s arguments — that is very strange for any serious
reader of Derrida, and that is just how ‘non-Derridean’ the book
often seems.9 One can take as an index of this Hägglund’s reliance
on clear, discrete oppositions. Writing about the relationship — or,
in his view, non-relationship — between deconstruction and religion,
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for example, Hägglund writes: ‘all attempts to assimilate Derrida’s
thinking to a religious framework are wrongheaded’ (116);10 more
specifically, concerning negative theology, he argues that ‘the logic
of negative theology and the logic of deconstruction are diametrically
opposite’ (5). Indeed, the book abounds in claims about traditions that
are the ‘diametrical opposite’ of deconstruction, and about thinkers
who ‘completely misunderstand’ or ‘systematically misread’ Derrida,
as though what were at stake was the protection of his work from their
contamination.11
Hägglund is of course free to make his arguments in any way he
sees fit, and he himself notes the distinction between his work and
that of Derrida, and at the same time makes an important point about
reading the latter, when he writes in the introduction that his aim
is ‘not simply to accept what is handed down’ from Derrida, but ‘to
reaffirm [his] legacy in order to make it live on in a different way’ (12).
I sympathize with what Hägglund says here — uncritical acceptance,
after all, has no place in analysis. But what exactly are the stakes of
Hägglund’s very different approach? Does this approach, in a book that
claims time and again to work within ‘deconstructive logic’,12 mean
that Hägglund misses something essential about Derrida’s thinking —
specifically, where the interests of this essay are concerned, Derrida’s
thinking about negative theology, and more broadly, the place of faith
in deconstruction?
In order to respond to these questions, we turn first to the poet
Derrida reads in Sauf le nom, Angelus Silesius.
And specifically, to the theme of nothingness in Silesius. Hägglund is
deeply critical of the ways negative theology conceives of nothingness,
writing the following: ‘There is nothing radical about saying that
God is nothing as long as one means that God is nothing that
can be apprehended by a finite being, but is infinitely superior to
anything that can be described in language’ (4).13 But is this the last
word on nothingness in negative theology? We will respond to this
question by thinking about the prominent place this theme occupies in
Silesius — indeed, the experience of nothingness is crucial throughout
the Cherubinic Wanderer. Silesius writes, for instance, that in order to
approach God, ‘You must be nothing / want nothing’;14 a little later,
he writes that ‘God is truly nothing’ (I: 200). Some verses seem entirely
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devoted to the theme of nothingness, for example this one, which
Derrida quotes:
To become Nothing is to become God
Nothing becomes what it is before: if you do not become nothing,
Never will you be born of eternal light. (VI: 130)15
Or this one:
Wanting nothing makes one like God.
God is eternal peace / because he searches for and wants nothing:
If you also want nothing / you are even more. (I: 76)
This last verse is especially interesting for our purposes, since it deals
with desire, and read from a certain standpoint, it could be seen
to provide evidence for Hägglund’s claims about negative theology:
Silesius writes, after all, that in wanting nothing, one becomes ‘more.’
In this sense, the verse appears to fit neatly within the logic of
the concept most often associated with negative theology: that of
apophasis. Apophasis, as we usually understand it, describes a negation
by way of which one approaches God: I make a statement about God,
but since this statement attributes qualities to God — thus doing an
injustice to his unknowability — I must immediately negate it; no
sooner do I do this than my negation becomes an affirmation — an
attribution of qualities to God — and the whole operation must begin
again. In his 1994 book Mystical Languages of Unsaying, however,
Michael A. Sells argues that the term ‘negation’ is not really a suitable
translation for apophasis. ‘Apophasis,’ he writes, ‘can mean “negation,”
but its etymology suggests a meaning that more precisely characterises
the discourse in question: apo phasis (un-saying or speaking-away).’16
This begs the question: what exactly is unsaid? Sells continues:
The term apophasis is commonly paired with kataphasis (affirmation,
saying, speaking-with). Every act of unsaying demands or
presupposes a previous saying. Apophasis can reach a point
of intensity such that no single proposition concerning the
transcendent can stand on its own. Any saying (even a negative
saying) demands a correcting proposition, an unsaying. But that
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correcting proposition which unsays the previous proposition is
in itself a ‘saying’ that must be ‘unsaid’ in turn. It is in the
tension between the two propositions that the discourse becomes
meaningful. That tension is momentary. It must be continually re-
earned by ever new linguistic acts of unsaying. (2–3)
Unsaying, within this understanding, works in a back and forth
movement with saying or affirmation, and meaning is produced in
the tension between these poles. We can immediately see this logic
in Silesius: in the last verse we cited, for example, one approaches
God by wanting nothing; through wanting nothing, however, one
becomes ‘more’ (‘vil’), and this re-affirmation necessitates another act
of unsaying in order to undo it. Going away, language comes back, in
a kind of revolutionary movement.
But does this really get to the heart of what is happening in
Silesius? Let us consider his claim ‘One finds God by not-searching
(mit nicht-suchen)’ (I: 171). To say this is not simply to negate the
affirmation ‘one finds God through searching’: it is rather to say that
one approaches God in an experience of undoing or (to follow Sells)
unsaying one’s own search for him, an experience of letting go of
or abandoning the search that does not mean ceasing to search, but
rather that the search (or the ‘not-search’) takes place in its
abandonment: search and abandonment, in this schema, are somehow
one and the same.17 Rather than adding (to one’s knowledge,
devoutness, etc.) in order to approach God, one must instead take
away: the more one subtracts, the closer one gets to God, as though
God, far from a presence arrived at by way of an absence, were simply
an absence.
This doesn’t really perturb Hägglund’s claims, however: even if
Silesius’s God were pure nothingness, this nothingness could still be
said to lie ‘somewhere else’, in a beyond, a transcendent realm, and
in unsaying God, one would still be positing a superior being (even
if in the form of a nothingness). But Silesius puts forth yet another
understanding. Let us think about another statement he makes about
looking for, or in this case finding, God: ‘God is found in weakness’
(I: 57). What is weakness? It is certainly not a zero-point or absence of
strength; rather, it is usually thought of as something less than strength,
a reduction or diminution of the latter. But can we think of weakness in
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terms other than purely negative ones? If strength is usually associated
with a fullness of presence, a wholeness or a completion, then we
can think of weakness not as a lack, but as a work of incompletion;18
God, in Silesius’s formulation, would thus be found at that moment at
which one undertakes this work of incompletion on oneself. Silesius’s
term for this is ‘capable incapacity’ or ‘capable weakness,’ to suggest an
awkward translation of the title of one of his verses, ‘Das Vermoegende
Unvermoegen.’ The verse runs thus:
He who desires nothing / has nothing / knows nothing / loves
nothing / wants nothing;
Has / knows / desires / and loves all the more. (I: 45)
Clearly, there is an affirmation that occurs by way of a negation
in this verse, and we seem once more to be within the play of
apophasis and kataphasis. But let’s think about precisely how this
happens. In one respect, the more (‘jmmer vil’) undoes all of the
work of the nothing from the first line: we move from a lessening
or a move toward nothing to a ‘more.’ Yet this isn’t a back and
forth movement: one doesn’t switch from having and wanting nothing
in the first line, to obtaining ‘something’ in the second; rather, the
‘more’ indicates the ever-decreasing move toward nothingness: the
capacity of this incapacity lies not in an increase that would follow
a decrease, but rather in an ability to continually lessen, to ceaselessly
incomplete.
I have mentioned that my translation of this verse’s title is awkward,
which raises the question of how it has been translated elsewhere. Roger
Munier’s French translation is instructive: ‘La riche pauvreté.’19 The
choice of this final word is interesting for our purposes. Silesius himself
uses it often, for example in this verse in which poverty comes up three
times:
Poverty is divine.
God is the poorest thing / He is pure and free:
That’s why I say rightly and truly / that poverty is divine. (I: 65)
In one sense, there is nothing new about ascribing a divinity to poverty,
given the latter’s importance in Christianity, not to mention at very
124 Oxford Literary Review
least the other monotheisms. But this is a unique formulation of
poverty. Let’s begin with the term ‘the poorest thing’ — what exactly
does this mean? That God, of all the ‘things’ that exist, is somehow ‘the
poorest,’ and we should think about how radical a conception this is:
regardless of how small or poor something might appear, God is even
poorer; he is in other words, and contrary to the ostensible grammar
of the formulation, outside of comparison, for he is poorer than any
thing that can be thought, and thus cannot be one thing among many.
Indeed, the formulation ‘the poorest’ resonates with the well-known
conception of God as the ‘Most High’, whereby God is always beyond
any entity that can be thought. In Silesius’s formulation, God, rather
than the ‘Most High’, would consist of something like the ‘most low’
or ‘most small’ — or rather, ‘most poor’. This would appear to repeat
the logic of the Most High, whereby God is ‘elsewhere’, beyond or
transcendent. But in another verse, Silesius indicates that we should
understand this poverty differently.
To the sinner
The richest devil has not even a pebble:
You are a slave of the most poor: can you be even poorer? (Du bist
des aermbsten Sclav: kan auch was aermers seyn?) (III: 96, Silesius’s
emphasis)
God is thus ‘the most poor,’20 again seemingly inhabiting a
transcendent realm. But let’s think about exactly how Silesius
formulates this. Immediately after informing ‘the sinner’ that he is a
slave of the most poor, he asks: ‘can you be even poorer?’ ‘The most
poor’ or ‘the poorest,’ in other words, is not something unattainable: it
is that aspect of poverty that ceaselessly ‘surpasses’ itself, that which is
always becoming poorer . . . than itself. Far from a beyond, it would
be more accurate to say that it is the experience of a ‘before’: it is
that which just precedes the experience of fullness, that which makes
fullness ever so slightly less than itself. This, quite simply, is the
experience to which Silesius gives the name ‘God’ (to which only
this name could apply): the experience by way of which, at every
moment, one incompletes oneself; the experience by way of which, at
every moment, one becomes even poorer than one was before.
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And this is the moment to return to one of the first verses of
Silesius that we looked at, a verse concerning desire. Recall that Silesius
writes: ‘Nichts wollen macht GOtte gleich’ (I: 76); God searches for
and desires nothing, and if you do the same, you are even more.
But our understanding of the work of impoverishment in Silesius
allows us to read this verse differently. What Silesius suggests is not
that, by way of desiring nothing, one approaches the fullness or the
transcendence of God. His affirmation is altogether different: the
divine, in this formulation, is located not so much in or beyond the
desire for nothing, as in the rendering-nothing, the annihilation, of
one’s own desire. To want nothingness, in other words, is not to desire
a beyond: it is rather to impoverish one’s own desire, to hollow it out,
to ceaselessly render it less than it was before. To unsay desire, without
the fullness of a saying ever coming to take its place, ever coming to
redeem it.
A desire unsaid, unspoken, or better, that speaks its own poverty, that
speaks in a voice with no lungs behind it, we might say, paraphrasing
Kafka.21 Is it any surprise that the two greatest twentieth century
thinkers of neutrality, Blanchot and Barthes, were both drawn to
Silesius?22 The neutral, after all, designates a work of lessening, the
hollowing out of a fullness, that which ‘ruins everything, all the
while leaving everything intact.’23 And indeed, Derrida is not far from
these formulations of the neutral when he speaks about desire in
Sauf le nom: when he suggests, for example, that there are two types
of apophasis, one that can ‘respond to, correspond to, correspond
with the most insatiable desire of God ’, while at the same time ‘[t]he
other apophasis, the other voice, can remain radically foreign to all
desire, in any case to every anthropo-theomorphic form of desire’
(37/18–19, Derrida’s emphasis, translation modified); or when, in
response to this formulation, he asks: ‘But isn’t it proper to desire to
carry within it its own suspension, the death or the phantom of desire?
To go toward the absolute other, isn’t that the extreme tension of a
desire that tries thereby to renounce its own force, its own movement
of appropriation?’ (37/19, translation modified). When we speak of
apophasis, Derrida says with the very last words of the book, we are
speaking of a ‘literature’ that ‘holds desire in suspense (tient le désir en
haleine), and always saying too much or too little, it leaves you at each
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moment without ever departing’ (85/113–114, translation modified).
What is this renounced, suspended, ghostly desire; what is this voice of
desire that speaks with bated breath?
Let us note at this point just how close we are to negative theology,
and indeed to an experience of faith that negative theology articulates. I
am thinking specifically of the theme of Gelassenheit (a term we usually
associate with Meister Eckhart, but which is also very important for
Silesius24), and indeed, are not Derrida’s final words — ‘elle vous laisse
chaque fois sans vous quitter jamais’ (114) — a perfect formulation
of the thinking of faith that Gelassenheit undertakes? One could
nonetheless argue that faith is what definitively separates Derrida from
Silesius, as the latter’s faith is of course deeply Christian. But one
of the key arguments in Sauf le nom is that faith, in Silesius and
in negative theology as a whole, cannot be reduced to its Christian
element. Derrida writes the following of apophasis: ‘An immediate
but intuitionless mysticism, a sort of abstract kenosis, frees it from all
authority, all narrative, all dogma, all belief — and at the limit, from all
determinable faith’ (71/86, Derrida’s emphasis, translation modified25);
we are dealing here with a mysticism that remains ‘independent of
all history of Christianity, absolutely independent’ (71/86, Derrida’s
emphasis). This independent and indeterminable faith is nonetheless
decidedly political : immediately after noting the independence of
negative theology, Derrida writes: ‘Whence the courage and the dissi-
dence, potential or actual, of these masters (think of Eckhart), whence
the persecution they suffered at times, whence their passion, whence
this scent of heresy, these trials, this subversive marginality of the
apophatic current in the history of theology and of the Church’
(71/86); and these reflections come about shortly after Derrida has
reflected upon apophasis’s revolutionary nature. What is the political
faith, indeed the revolutionary faith, that we are dealing with here?
Perhaps this word — faith — tells us everything we need to know.
Perhaps what we are dealing with is a certain thinking of the future,
one indicated by faith, a faith that names the suspended, impoverished
desire of which we have just spoken. A faith, a future, that is in some
way the deconstruction of desire. In order to think about this, we will
pass again through Hägglund’s book.
I argued above that the key concept in Hägglund’s book is that of
desire, and recall that this is always a desire for a radical atheism: as
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opposed to traditional atheism, which at times figures as a lament for
the absence of God — a desire for an impossible presence — radical
atheism is an affirmation of the ‘time of life’. What is the nature of
this time? In order to understand the way Hägglund conceives of it, we
turn to the first chapter of his book, ‘Autoimmunity of Time: Derrida
and Kant’. Early in this chapter, Hägglund notes that Kant’s treatment
of time is based on the principle of noncontradiction: the present
cannot contradict the future; they must remain discrete so as not to
contaminate one another. How, then, is temporal synthesis possible?
As Hägglund writes, ‘Kant’s solution to the problem is to contrast the
ever-changing empirical consciousness with the unity of transcendental
apperception’ (23), in other words to locate a basis for the subject that
is immune from the effects of time. Derrida’s understanding of time is
of course quite different:
Derrida argues that the unconditional is the spacing of time that
divides every instance in advance and makes it essentially dependent
on what is other than itself. What makes X possible is at the same time
what makes it impossible for X to be in itself. Such is the minimal
formula for the illogical logic of identity that deconstructive reason
employs. (25, Hägglund’s emphases)
Deconstruction thus challenges the principle of noncontradiction on
which Kant’s thought depends, all the while remaining ‘logical’,
and the workings of this logic depend on what Hägglund refers to
throughout this chapter as ‘the structure of the trace’: the present is
always divided from itself ; it is always at once the past that it has left
behind (yet retains within itself), and the future that it anticipates (but
which already works it over, transgresses it). This is what makes ‘every
instance,’ as Hägglund says in the passage quoted above, ‘other than
itself’.
Where the future is concerned, therefore, to live the ‘time of life’
means to be open to what is at once the chance and the threat
of the future, and most importantly to embrace this alterity of the
future — to say yes to it, to desire it. One cannot but agree on this
point — what would the ‘time of life’ be if we could predict the
future? — and indeed Hägglund insists again and again on this essential
alterity or unknowability of the future: the phrases he uses most often
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to designate this are ‘undecidable future’ and ‘undecidable coming
of time’. ‘The coming of the future’, he writes, ‘is strictly speaking
“undecidable”, since it is a relentless displacement that unsettles any
definitive assurance or given meaning. One can never know what will
have happened. Promises may always be turned into threats, friendships
into enmities, fidelities into betrayals, and so on’ (40, Hägglund’s
emphasis). Hence the agony of the decision in Derrida: ‘it is because
the future cannot be decided in advance that one has to make decisions’
(40, Hägglund’s emphasis).
In a way, this conception is very faithful to Derrida: who has
taught us more about the unforeseeability and undecidability of the
future, and more broadly, the intricate play of time and alterity, than
he? What is it in these claims, then, that strikes us as so different
from ‘deconstructive logic’, as Hägglund puts it? I am speaking of a
tendency in Hägglund that moves him away from one of Derrida’s
most important insights, where time is concerned — ironically, that
moves away from an aspect of the future that is tied intimately to
the question of noncontradiction. We might think of this as the dual
nature of the future. We will enter into this discussion by asking this
question: is the future, for Hägglund, separate from the present? On the
one hand, we have already seen that the answer is clearly no: Hägglund
is careful to note that what he is dealing with is the synthesis of time
onto which the structure of the trace opens. This renders all talk of
distinctions complex. One of the ways he discusses this synthesis is via
a discussion of Derrida’s use of
the French verb arriver, which can mean to come, to happen, and to
arrive. Derrida plays on these multiple meanings in order to reinforce
that what happens cannot be given in the form of presence but
is divided by the spacing of time. Every event is both superseded
(no longer) and to come (not yet) in its very event. Whatever
happens is therefore transgressed by the future and becomes past.
(29, Hägglund’s emphases)
This transgression of and by the future is deeply interesting: it shows
that what is present can never only be present, but is rather divided
within itself, spacing itself out into the future. Hägglund is nonetheless
careful to note that this future, this to come, is not yet — he even
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emphasizes this term, which comes up again a couple of pages later,
where he writes, in the context of a reading of Derrida’s book Rogues,
that
one cannot know in advance how one should act in relation to [the
other]. On the contrary, the relation to the other is inseparable from
the coming of time, which means that it may alter its character at
every moment. One cannot face up to or even face the other (. . . )
since the other is no longer or not yet. (31, Hägglund’s emphases)
How exactly are we to read this recurring ‘not yet’? On the one hand,
nothing is more natural than to think of the future in this way: the
future, after all, is that which has not yet happened. On the other
hand, this ‘not yet’, which is consistent with Hägglund’s concept of
a time ‘divided within itself’, bearer of a constitutional separation from
itself, reveals a tendency in Hägglund — one that coexists with the
complex synthesis by which he understands time — to view the future
as a beyond, as something that will arrive somewhere else. Strangely, in
this book that seeks an openness to contamination, and in this chapter
that aims to build an ‘illogical logic’ of noncontradiction, Hägglund
insists on a division: a clear separation between present and future.
This is not to say that the future is not irreducibly other,
unforeseeable, indeed ‘not yet’, and indeed on the very same page
from which I have taken the last quotation, Hägglund cites a passage
from Rogues in which Derrida argues that the logic of the event is
marked by a ‘passivity’ or ‘vulnerability’ in which ‘it is not yet or is
already no longer possible to face or face up to the unforeseeability
of the other’ (quoted in Hägglund, 30–31). Yet Derrida’s ‘not yet’
resonates in a way that is very different from that of Hägglund, and this
difference is marked here by the word ‘vulnerability’ and, even better,
‘passivity’. What does it mean to be passive with regards to the future?
It means that, in some way, the future has already come — already
come to pass, we might say — in its very status as not yet: the future
is that element, at once irreducibly other, undecidable, etc., which is
already intruding upon the present; the future is already speaking in
the present and indeed writing the present. On the one hand, there
are many possible futures, which is why we must remain open to
its unforeseeability: anything at all may come about. On the other
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hand, the future has already been decided (indeed this is what is most
agonizing about the decision), hence rendering impossible a situation
in which a subject freely decides between various paths: the present
is passive with regards to the future insofar as the future is already
working it over, already speaking within it. The future — and this is
where Derrida and Silesius truly come together — is that aspect of the
present by which the latter lessens itself, incessantly reduces itself; the
future is that which impoverishes the present, hollowing it out, making
it less than what it is, insofar as it takes the fullness or the autonomy of
the present — one of the key aspects of which is the present’s ability to
determine what it will become — and hollows it out by turning it into
what it must invariably be, pointing it in a single, irrevocable direction.
The future is the present’s interruption or impoverishment of itself,
that aspect of itself which is not yet, not in the sense of something
that is not yet here, but rather in the sense of that which is just now
coming into being: the future is at once the present’s constitution
and its undoing, or, better, its simultaneous self-proclamation and
unsaying.
This future-as-impoverishment that comes about in the dialogue
between Derrida and Silesius is what Hägglund’s conceptual apparatus
keeps him from understanding, for the simple reason that this future
does not work on the level of the concept, but is rather that which
at each moment subtracts itself from the latter: far from gathering
seemingly disparate elements into a whole, as per the work of the
concept, this future works by incompleting, undoing, unsaying. This
is why one can’t access it via the concept of desire on which Hägglund
relies so heavily — is it any surprise that Derrida, whenever he deals
with desire in Sauf le nom, treats it with such suspicion? There is of
course a kind of desire at work in Derrida’s text, a ‘desire of the desert’,
as he suggests toward the end of the book.26 But one wonders whether
the proper term for this ruined, unsaid desire wouldn’t be desire at all,
but rather faith, a faith that neither waits for nor seeks to appropriate
that which is to come, but rather abandons itself to that which is already
taking place. A faith, therefore, inseparable from works, and this is the
sense — a quasi-mystical sense — in which it is revolutionary, in that
the one who is traversed by it refuses to see any division between faith
and world, any separation between the present and that which, for him
or her, is already coming into being.27 A faith that unsays all of these
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divisions, incessantly; a faith of the not yet that is at the same time
resolutely here and now. The faith of revolution.
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137–147, compares mystical detachment with ‘the formation of the revolutionary
will of a subordinated class’ (141): on the one hand, he writes, this revolutionary will
‘transcends all particular engagements and, in that sense, requires that the class be
detached from them; on the other hand, without serious engagements in particular
events there is no constitution of the revolutionary will’ (141–2). As with the mystic,
the revolutionary, in this formulation, engages with the world not to transcend it,
but to see in it its own beyond, its own surpassing of itself.
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judéo-chrétien (De la foi)’, draws a link between two ‘Jacques’ — Derrida and the
Biblical James — in order to put forth a thinking of faith in which ‘les oeuvres (. . . )
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I will explore the links between faith and revolution in all three of these thinkers
in a later work.
